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INTRODUCTION
It has long been understood that an apology can have extraordinary
emotional and psychological benefits for both the recipient and the person
giving the apology.1 In recent years, many practical results of apologizing
*
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1. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology
into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 87 (2004); Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan:
The Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545, 545 (2000).
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have been realized as well.2 In politics, apologies are frequently given by
leaders in the wake of a wrongdoing or scandal.3 While many of these
apologies are undoubtedly sincere, they may also serve the dual purpose of
preventing further media scrutiny. As recently as February 2014, President
Obama issued a handwritten apology to a professor after making a
statement in a speech that devalued art history majors.4 While such
apologies may not work in every political context, in this case the
President’s personal touch was effective, leading the professor to reverse
course from her previous criticisms.5
Additionally, in the legal context an apology can serve as a useful
tool in civil litigation. A sincere apology can help promote judicial
economy by unlocking stalled settlement negotiations.6 Moreover, when an
apology is offered at earlier stages in a negotiation, such a statement can
help ensure that impasse is avoided altogether.7
Jurisdictions differ in their treatment of apologies; in some
locations, apologies can even be legally dangerous as the statement may be
admissible evidence at trial to establish liability or to prove some other
element of an offense.8 This potential liability leads many attorneys and
insurance companies to encourage their clients to avoid apologizing
following an accident.9 Take, for example, a scene from the popular
television show Parks and Recreation, in which beloved civil servant Leslie
Knope attempts to apologize to a friend, Andy, after he was injured in an
accident caused by the city.10 Before Leslie is able to speak with Andy, she
is discouraged from apologizing by the city attorney.11
Attorney: Hi, Scott Braddock, city attorney.
2. See Brent T. White, SAY YOU’RE SORRY: COURT-ORDERED APOLOGIES AS
A CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1269 (2006) (citing Lee Taft,
Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000); Deborah
L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997)).
3. See Robert R. Weyeneth, The Power of Apology and the Process of Historical
Reconciliation, 23 THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN 9, 12 (2001).
4. The President stated, “[a] lot of young people no longer see the trades and skilled
manufacturing as a viable career, but I promise you, folks can make a lot more potentially
with skilled manufacturing or the trades than they might with an art-history degree.” Geoff
Earle, Obama Apologizes to Art Teacher for Mocking Art-History Degrees, NEW YORK POST
(Feb. 18, 2014), available at http://nypost.com/2014/02/18/obama-apologizes-to-art-teacherfor-mocking-art-history-degrees/.
5. Id. The professor later indicated on her Facebook page that she loves Obama and
now feels badly about the whole incident. Id.
6. See Bolstad, supra note 1, at 569.
7. See id.
8. Jeffrey S. Helmreich, Does ‘Sorry’ Incriminate? Evidence, Harm and the
Protection of Apology, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 567, 568–69 (2012).
9. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apology-Help or Hindrance?, 10 No. 3 DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Spring 2004, at 33, 33 [hereinafter Apology].
10. Parks and Recreation: Kaboom (NBC television broadcast Oct. 22, 2009).
11. Id.
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Leslie: Hey Scott, I didn’t know that you were friends with Andy.
Attorney: I never met him. What I do know is that he could sue us
at the drop of a hat. I mean, right now he is the most dangerous man in [the
city].
Leslie: Is that all you lawyers think about? Lawsuits, and laws, and
legalese?
Attorney: Yes.
Leslie: You can relax. All I’m going do is go in and just say,
“We’re so sorry, it’s entirely our fault.”
Attorney: No, no, no. You can’t say any of that. It admits liability.
You can’t say “I’m sorry,” or “I apologize.” It implies guilt.
Leslie: That’s insane, I have to apologize. Andy was the victim . . .
Attorney: Can’t say victim.
Leslie: . . . of an extremely unfortunate situation.
Attorney: Can’t say “unfortunate” and you can’t say “situation.”
Leslie: I can’t say the word “situation?”
Attorney: No it implies there was a situation.12
While this fictional example may be slightly hyperbolic, the advice
given by the attorney above does not differ greatly from that of real
attorneys in many situations, many of whom fear that the statement will be
admitted as proof of liability.
One situation in which an attorney may advise a client against
apologizing is when an incident gives rise to a federal civil suit. Currently,
the Federal Rules of Evidence do not contain a provision specifically
providing evidentiary protection for apologies. While some apologies may
be excluded under Rule 408, which protects certain conduct or statements
made during compromise negotiations, this rule contains a variety of
limitations and, as a result, many apologetic statements are admissible as
evidence.13
Recognizing the benefits of apologizing and the legal danger of
doing so, a number of states have adopted legislation and rules providing
evidentiary protection for apologies made by those who have caused
another individual harm in certain situations.14 These statutes take on a
variety of forms and offer different levels of protection. The majority of
these state statutes provide evidentiary protection for expressions of a
general sense of sympathy or benevolence, i.e. “partial apologies.”15 Such
12. Id.
13. FED. R. EVID. 408; Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83
JUDICATURE 180, 188 (2000).
14. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349, 354–56 (2008).
15. See Edward A. Dauer, Apology in the Aftermath of Injury: Colorado’s “I’m Sorry
Law,” 35 COLO. LAW. 47, 47 (2005). For partial apology statutes that apply only in the
context of medical malpractice see ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.544 (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 4318 (2014); D.C. CODE § 16-2841 (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207 (2014); LA.
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statutes protect statements like, “I am sorry this happened to you.”16
Several states have created statutes that go further and extend protection to
fault admitting statements, i.e. “full apologies,” in the limited context of
medical malpractice.17 Unlike partial apology statutes, these state statutes
also protect statements like, “I’m sorry that I did this to you.”18
Scholars and commentators are divided as to their treatment of
these approaches.19 Some argue that the law should not provide any
evidentiary protection for apologies because such protection will exclude
evidence probative of fault, discourage apologies, and undermine the
sincerity of these apologies.20 Others argue that U.S. law will be enriched
by the protection of apologies, specifically “full apology” statements,
because such statements promote judicial economy by encouraging
settlement.21 These commentators argue that a full apology is much more
likely than a partial apology, or no apology, to facilitate settlement because

REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2907 (2014); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2155 (2014);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1201 (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (West 2014); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-52.1 (2013). For partial apology statutes that apply broadly see CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1160 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026 (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, R.
409.5 (2014); IND. CODE § 34-43.5-1-4 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (2014); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4 (West 2014); TENN. R. EVID. 409.1 (2014); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-422 (West 2013). Note that
several of these statutes do not expressly exclude statements of fault but have been
interpreted by courts as doing so. See Lawrence v. MountainStar Healthcare, 320 P.3d 1037,
1051 (Utah Ct. App. 2014); see also Davis v. Wooster Orthopaedics & Sports Med., Inc. 952
N.E.2d 1216, 1218, 1220–21 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (holding that state statutes ambiguously
prohibiting admission of statements expressing “apology” or a “general sense of
benevolence” do not include prohibitions on statements of fault). The following statutes also
appear to impliedly protect only partial apologies but have not yet been the subject of
litigation: IOWA CODE § 622.31 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (2014); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-814 (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 413 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 31-04-12 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H (2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082
(2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-12-14 (2014); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-11a (2014); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130 (2014).
16. Dauer, supra note 15 at 47.
17. Id. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135
(2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184d (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-416 (2014); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 19-1-190 (2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 5.64.010 (2014); WIS. STAT. § 904.14 (2014).
18. Dauer, supra note 15 at 47.
19. Compare Lucinda E. Jesson & Peter B. Knapp, My Lawyer Told Me to Say I’m
Sorry: Lawyers, Doctors, And Medical Apologies, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1410, 1411
(2009) (exhibiting skepticism that evidentiary rules can influence human behavior and
arguing that such rules undercut the moral weight of apologies), with Jonathan R. Cohen,
Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1068 (1999) (discussing the
emotional and strategic benefits apologizing may bring to clients when done in a “safe” legal
means) [hereinafter Advising Clients].
20. See Jesson & Knapp, supra note 19, at 1438.
21. Michael B. Runnels, Apologies All Around: Advocating Federal Protection for the
Full Apology in Civil Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 145 (2009).
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fault-admitting, full apologies are viewed as more sincere expressions of
remorse.22
This note seeks to strike a balance between these two positions by
advocating for the approach adopted by a majority of states: evidentiary
protection for some, but not all apologies. Such an approach, while not
perfect, aligns the competing interests of encouraging the legal,
psychological, and emotional benefits that accompany apologies with
preserving a plaintiff’s right to utilize probative evidence. By way of
introduction, section one of this note briefly discusses the current legal
treatment of apologies in United States jurisdictions. Section two compares
the advantages of excluding apologetic statements from evidence with the
disadvantages of such evidentiary protection and further describes how a
balance may be achieved between these two positions. Section three seeks
to incorporate this balance into the Federal Rules of Evidence by proposing
an amendment to specifically grant evidentiary protection for certain
apologies.
I. THE EVOLVING TREATMENT OF APOLOGIES
The meaning of the word “apology” has changed significantly since
its origins in the sixteenth century.23 While today most think of an apology
as including expressions of regret and sympathy, admissions of
responsibility, and promises of forbearance, the term once did not confer
such meaning.24 The word “apology” originates from the Greek word
“apologia,” meaning, “to speak in one’s defense.”25 In this original
meaning, a person offering an apology was not expressing regret for his
actions, but was seeking to justify his behavior and to defend himself from
accusations.26 In this sense, the word apology was more synonymous with
“excuse” than today’s typical, “I’m sorry.”27
Soon after its introduction, however, the meaning of apology
changed from self-justification towards implying regret.28 It was first used
to “describe the process of excusing oneself from the wrath of a person
22. See generally id.
23. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 553 (2d 1989).
24. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 546 (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 553 (2d
1989)); JAY FOLBERG, DWIGHT GOLANN, THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH & LISA A KLOPPENBERG,
RESOLVING DISPUTES THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 156 (Aspen Publishers, 2d ed. 2010).
25. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 546 (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 553 (2d
1989)).
26. Michael Quinion, Apology, WORLD WIDE WORDS,
http://www.worldwidewords.org/topicalwords/tw-apo1.htm (last modified Jan. 17, 1998).
The first use of the word “apology” recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary is in the title
Apologie or Syr Thomas More, Knyght; made by him, after he had geuen ouer the Officer of
Lord Chancellor of Englande, dated 1533. Id. In this usage, Sir Thomas More was not
regretting his actions, but was offering a justification. Id.
27. See id.
28. Id.
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affected by one’s actions” and conferred the sentiment that no offense was
intended.29 Then, the term shifted to embrace our modern definition and
was an acknowledgement that some offense had in fact been given and was
an expression of regret for such an offense.30
Presently, our society encourages apologies from an early age.31
Children are taught early to “say you’re sorry,” in the understanding that an
apology can be a powerful tool in restoring and maintaining social
relationships.32 However in the United States, the benefits of apologizing
learned as a child are often forgotten by the time one becomes an adult.33
In fact, Americans apologize much less frequently than do
members of other societies.34 For instance, in Japan apologies are an
integral part of the mutual interdependence and hierarchical relations that
are hallmarks of Japanese culture.35 Apologizing is a sign of an
individual’s desire to restore or maintain a positive relationship with the
other party despite a temporary disruption to the relationship.36
Exemplifying this belief is the Japanese practice of apologizing even when
one thinks that the other party is at fault.37
The societal preference for apologies in Japan is recognized and
encouraged through Japanese civil law in several ways.38 First, Japan is a
nation with a history of promoting the use of various methods of alternative
dispute resolution.39 In these non-litigation scenarios, there is little
emphasis on determining fault, but rather the goal is to preserve the longterm relationship between the parties.40 Second, when cases do reach
litigation, “there is evidence that Japanese judges do not see the offering of
an apology as an admission of liability.”41 Thus, apologies are freely given
following an accident because parties are less worried about their
statements being used as an admission of fault.42
Conversely, apologies in the United States are less frequent than in
Japanese society.43 Americans seem to save the most extravagant,
apologetic language, words like “I beg your pardon,” for those situations
“which are least serious, such as when one bumps into a stranger on the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Bolstad, supra note 1, at 547.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 545.
Id. at 553.
Bolstad, supra note 1, at 553.
Id.
See id. at 559–60.
Id.
See id. at 560.
Bolstad, supra note 1, at 559.
See id.
Id.

2015]

STRIKING A BALANCE

249

street.”44 Additionally, consistent with the historical definitions of the word
“apology,” the American apology is more likely accompanied by an excuse
or explanation of why the behavior in question occurred than are Japanese
apologies.45 At times, American society even takes a hostile view of an
apology, viewing apologies as a sign of weakness.46 For example, one
political scientist commented, “To apologize for substantive things you’ve
done raises the white flag. There is a school of thought in politics that you
never say you’re sorry. The best defense is a good offense.”47
Also, as mentioned above, unlike the Japanese legal system,
apologies can be legally dangerous in many United States jurisdictions.48
Such statements are ordinarily admissible in court to prove liability or
another element of a claim.49 This has led many lawyers to advise clients to
avoid post-accident apologies in order to prevent contributing to liability
judgments.50 However, despite this tendency to admit apologies into
evidence, there are a variety of rules, depending on the jurisdiction and
circumstance that may limit the admissibility of an apology as evidence.
These rules vary from no evidentiary protection for apologies under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, to protection for “partial apologies” in a number
of states, and, finally, protection for “fault-admitting” apologies in a few
jurisdictions.
A. Apologies under the Federal Rules of Evidence
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) little, if any,
evidentiary protection is provided to apologies. On the contrary, the rules
provide that apologies are generally admissible to prove the liability of the
apologizer.51 FRE 801(d)(2) states that admissions by a party-opponent are
“not hearsay,” and, therefore, are not excluded by the rule against hearsay
when offered against that party.52 Thus, even though an apology fits within
the classic definition of hearsay, an out of court statement offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, it is admissible under the Federal Rules as
non-hearsay.53 This rule allows a party-opponent’s apology into evidence
regardless of whether the apology actually “admits” anything in the course
of apologizing.54 Rule 801(d)(2) defines an “admission” by a party44. Id. at 561.
45. Id.
46. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 563.
47. Id. (quoting Deborah Tannen, I’m Sorry, I Won’t Apologize, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
1996, at 6, 34).
48. Id. at 559. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U.
CIN. L. REV. 819, 824–25 (2002) [hereinafter Legislating Apology].
49. Id. at 824.
50. Helmreich, supra note 8, at 573.
51. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
52. Id.
53. Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 824–25.
54. Id. at 825.
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opponent as, among other things, “the party’s own statement, in either an
individual or a representative capacity.”55 Thus, an apology by a partyopponent is admissible non-hearsay regardless of whether it admits any
fault.56
However, despite the general admissibility of apologies, there are
several rules under the FRE that may preclude an apology from admission.
FRE 501 provides that, “in a civil case, state law governs privilege
regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of
decision.”57 Thus, where an apology is made in a situation covered under a
state privilege, such as mediation, and is being offered in a federal civil
case not grounded on a federal question, such a statement may be excluded
from admissibility.58
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly for purposes of
discussion here, FRE 408 provides in part that, “Evidence of conduct or
statements made in a compromise negotiation is . . . not admissible [to
prove liability for or invalidity of a claim or its amount].”59 Under this rule,
evidence of settlement or attempted settlement of a disputed claim is
inadmissible when offered as an admission of liability.60 Thus, if an
apology fits within the parameters of this rule, it is not admissible as
evidence.
FRE 408 was created with the purpose of “encourag[ing]
settlements which would be discouraged if such evidence were
admissible.”61 Under the common law, statements made in the course of
settlement negotiations were admissible in court unless they were made in
hypothetical form, preceded by the terms “without prejudice,” or so
intertwined with an offer of settlement as to be inseparable from it.62 As a
result of the disadvantages that accompanied these required legal
formalisms, such as inhibiting settlement and compromising
communications, FRE 408 was created to expand the confidentiality of
private statements made during settlement negotiations and to set the
benchmark that settlement negotiations are inadmissible with or without
such legal formalisms.63

55. Id. at 824 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)) (emphasis added).
56. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
57. Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 825; FED. R. EVID. 501.
58. Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 825. The rationale underlying FRE 501 is
that, in accordance with Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), “federal law should
not supersede that of the States in substantive areas such as privilege absent a compelling
reason.” FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s notes. The advisory committee believed
that in civil cases not grounded upon a federal question, there would be no such compelling
reason to supersede state law. Id.
59. Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 825–26 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 408).
60. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes.
61. Id.
62. Advising Clients, supra note 19, at 1033.
63. Id. at 1033–34; Bolstad, supra note 1, at 572.

2015]

STRIKING A BALANCE

251

However, FRE 408 is not without its limitations, and some scholars
have suggested that it has fallen short of its goal of promoting private
settlements.64 First, FRE 408 bars statements made during settlement
negotiations from introduction at trial, but does not cover pre-trial
discovery or administrative or legislative hearings.65 An apology made
during a mediation or settlement negotiation is admissible in those
scenarios.66 Additionally, FRE 408 does not protect a party from revealing
such an apology to the public at large outside of the courtroom.67 This
loophole has the potential to become a significant deterrent to apologizing,
especially in situations with large corporate entities who may wish to avoid
negative publicity.
Second, FRE 408 only excludes the admission into evidence of
conduct or statements, such as apologies, when such conduct or statements
are offered, “to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim
or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction . . . .”68
FRE 408 explicitly provides that such evidence is admissible, “for another
purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution.”69 Re-emphasizing this point, the advisory
committee acknowledges extensive case law recognizing that FRE 408 is
inapplicable when compromising evidence is offered for a purpose other
than to prove the validity, invalidity, or amount of a disputed claim.70
Therefore, if an apology is offered for one of these other reasons, it is
admissible as evidence.
64. See Advising Clients, supra note 19, at 1034.
65. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 572.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 573.
68. FED. R. EVID. 408.
69. Id. Prior to the 2006 amendment of FRE 408, compromise evidence was
admissible to impeach by contradiction or inconsistent statement. See Advising Clients,
supra note 19, at 1034. Thus, “if a defendant who admitted his guilt when apologizing
during settlement negotiations were later to deny his guilt at trial, the earlier admission likely
could be used against him for impeachment.” Id. at 1035. However, because “[s]uch broad
impeachment would tend to swallow the exclusionary rule and would impair the public
policy of promoting settlements,” FRE 408 was amended to prohibit use of such evidence
for this purpose. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes.
70. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes. See, e.g., Athey v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 234 F.3d 357, 362 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that evidence of settlement offer by
insurer was properly admitted to prove insurer’s bad faith); Coakley & Williams v.
Structural Concrete Equip., 973 F.2d 349, 353–54 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence of
settlement is not precluded by Rule 408 where offered to prove a party’s intent with respect
to the scope of a release); Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 708 F.2d 683, 691 (7th Cir.
1985) (explaining that Rule 408 does not bar evidence of a settlement when offered to prove
a breach of the settlement agreement, as the purpose of the evidence is to prove the fact of
settlement as opposed to the validity or amount of the underlying claim); Uforma/Shelby
Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1284, 1294 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding threats made in
settlement negotiations were admissible because Rule 408 is inapplicable when the claim is
based upon a wrong that is committed during the course of settlement negotiations).
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Third, FRE 408 can only be used by parties to litigation.71
Apologies made by individuals who are not parties to a case may be
admitted under any circumstances without violation of FRE 408.72 This
lack of protection “could create serious problems for the apologizer, with
the possible result of being forced to defend numerous other suits inspired
by the revelation of the apology” in court.73
Finally, FRE 408 only protects apologetic conduct or statements if
the conduct or statements constitute, or are made in pursuit of, a
compromise to a dispute on either the validity or amount of a claim.74 It is
not always clear, however, as to exactly what constitutes a “compromise
negotiation” and whether a dispute exists as to the validity or amount of a
claim. Certainly, once a legal claim has been filed, FRE 408 will apply, but
it is unclear whether a statement made before a claim has been filed will be
considered “made during” a compromise negotiation of a disputed claim.75
For instance, a spontaneous apology in a parking lot following a fenderbender might not qualify.76 This seemingly “gray area” is a substantial
limitation to any evidentiary protection afforded to apologies by FRE 408,
as the issue of whether a certain statement occurred during a “compromise
negotiation” is up for varying interpretations by courts in differing
jurisdictions.
B. State Apology Laws
Contrary to the “all-inclusive” Federal Rules of Evidence, states
vary in their approaches to evidentiary protection of apologies. While most
state rules of evidence have provisions analogous to FRE 408, a great
number of states provide other mechanisms for protecting apologetic
statements such as evidentiary rules and confidentiality statutes. These
state rules vary in the scope of their protection and in the circumstances
such protection is offered.
i. State Rules of Evidence
As of the time of this note, thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have enacted statutes or evidentiary rules promoting apologies by
providing express evidentiary protection for such statements in some, but
not all, situations.77 This trend towards protecting apologies began in 1986
when Massachusetts became the first state to adopt an evidentiary rule
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Bolstad, supra note 1, at 573.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes.
Advising Clients, supra note 19, at 1035.
Dauer, supra note 15, at 50.
See statutes supra notes 15, 17.
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specifically excluding certain types of apologetic statements from
The
admissibility when used to prove liability in civil cases.78
Massachusetts statute provides in part:
Statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the
pain, suffering or death of a person involved in an accident
and made to such person or to the family of such person
shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of
liability in a civil action.79
One issue left unresolved after the passage of this statute, however,
is the scope of apologetic statements protected from admissibility.80 The
statute most certainly protects statements like, “I hope you feel better
soon.”81 However, the law is unclear as to whether it covers statements
where fault is embedded within an expression of sympathy or benevolence,
such as, “I’m sorry that you are hurt,” or “I am sorry that I hurt you.”82
After passage of the Massachusetts apology statute, many states
followed suit creating apology rules of their own.83 These state statutes
resolve the question regarding the scope of protection with more clarity.84
Thirty of the thirty-eight jurisdictions that have adopted apology statutes
limit protection to “partial apologies.”85 Under these statutes, an apology
that expresses sympathy or benevolence after an accident is excluded from
evidence, but portions of an apology that include an embedded admission of
fault are admissible to prove liability.86 Apologies containing portions that
express benevolence and sympathy and portions that express fault will most
likely be parsed, if possible, with the fault admitting sections admissible.87
These partial apology states vary with regard to the types of cases
for which they offer evidentiary protection. Eleven states exclude
qualifying apologies generally in the context of civil litigation when such
statements are offered as evidence of liability.88 For example, Texas
adopted a statute with similar language as the Massachusetts rule, but its
statute additionally provides that, “a communication . . . which also
includes a statement or statements concerning negligence or culpable
78. Runnels, supra note 21, at 151. See also Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at
827.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (2014).
Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 827.
Id.
Id. at 829.
See statutes supra note 15.
Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 830.
See Dauer, supra note 15, at 48; statutes supra note 15.
Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 828–29.
See id. at 829.
See statutes supra note 15.
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conduct pertaining to an accident or event, is admissible to prove liability of
the communicator.”89
Additionally, eighteen “partial apology” states, and the District of
Columbia, have statutes that offer protection for medical malpractice
liability only.90 For example, Delaware’s apology statute provides in part
that:
Any and all statements, writings, gestures, or affirmations
made by a health care provider or an employee of a health
care provider that express apology (other than an
expression or admission of liability or fault), sympathy,
compassion, condolence, or benevolence . . . are
inadmissible in a civil action that is brought against a
health care provider.91
This statute provides evidentiary protection to a doctor who expresses his
sympathy to a family in the wake of medical malpractice, but does not
apply to car accidents, slip-and-fall cases, or other types of civil litigation.92
Recently, a few states have begun to provide evidentiary protection
for fault-admitting or “full,” apologies.93 For example, Colorado’s apology
statute covers, “gestures, or conduct expressing apology, fault, sympathy,
commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense of
benevolence[.]”94 Unlike partial apology statutes, this rule protects a
statement like, “Gosh I’m sorry I did this to you,” in addition to any general
expressions of sympathy.95 Notably, however, Colorado’s statute applies
only to civil actions alleging liability for unanticipated outcomes in health
care and to statements made by “a health care provider or an employee of a
health care provider” to an alleged victim.96 Arizona, Connecticut,
Georgia, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin also have
statutes protecting “full apologies,” but these statutes also apply exclusively
to medical malpractice.97
Regardless of what litigation scenario these statutes cover or
whether they cover partial or full apologies, all thirty-seven state apology
statutes and rules reflect their respective state legislatures’ beliefs that
89. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West 2013). Other states that
include general partial apology statutes include California, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. See statutes supra
note 15.
90. See statutes supra note 15.
91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318(b) (2013).
92. See id.
93. See statutes supra note 17.
94. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2014) (emphasis added).
95. Dauer, supra note 15 at 47.
96. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135.
97. See statutes supra note 17.
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protecting some, but not all, apologies is beneficial to the judicial system
and society as a whole.98 In fact, as of the time of this note, no state has a
statute allowing for the protection of apologies in all situations. By
allowing protection for apologies in limited situations, these legislatures
have achieved a balance between two competing interests: (1) encouraging
apologies and (2) preserving a plaintiff’s right to utilize probative evidence
of liability.99 This balancing approach has proven successful as the number
of states with protection for some, but not all, apologies continues to
grow.100
ii. State Confidentiality Statutes
In addition to providing protection for apologies through
evidentiary exclusion, many states have confidentiality statutes that provide
privileges for statements made during mediation.101 These privilege
statutes vary significantly from state to state in several ways, however.102
First, the scope of the privilege created by these statutes varies from statutes
that cover all communications made during mediation, to statutes that limit
the scope of information that is privileged, to only statements which are
relevant to the issue being mediated.103 For example, Washington and
Virginia have created specific subject-matter exceptions to their privilege
statutes.104 Second, these privilege statutes “vary according to whose
statements are covered.”105 In many states the privilege applies to all
mediation participants, but in other states, “only information originating
with the mediator or mediation program is privileged.” 106
Additionally, some states have opted against creating absolute
privileges for mediation. Instead, they have allowed the courts to develop
the privilege through a case-by-case analysis, in which the courts balance
the costs and benefits of a mediation privilege in a specific scenario.107
However, as one scholar points out, courts “have historically been loathe to
expand privileges,” therefore, relying on judicial review to create such a
privilege may very well be an arduous process.108 Also, conflict of law
issues can create problems for parties who wish to rely on mediation

98. See Helmreich, supra note 8, at 578–79.
99. See id.
100. See Runnels, supra note 21, at 151.
101. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22
(2014).
102. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 574.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 574 & n.276.
105. Id. at 574.
106. Id.
107. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 574.
108. Id.
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privileges for apologetic statements.109 Because the local law of the forum
will determine whether the privilege applies, a situation could arise in
which “a mediator or a party to a mediation in a state with an absolute
mediation privilege is subpoenaed by a party in a state with no mediation
confidentiality statute.”110 Further, as discussed above, FRE 501 provides
that in federal diversity cases the state’s privilege rules will apply, while in
federal question cases, statements made during mediation will not be
protected.111
Therefore, while mediation privileges can be trusted in some
instances to prevent disclosure of apologetic statements made during
mediation, the situation in many jurisdictions remains unclear and
potentially risky.112
C. Private Contractual Agreements
Finally, parties to dispute resolution procedures, such as mediation,
frequently enter into confidentiality agreements through which they are able
to address a variety of matters.113 Unlike federal and state statutory
protections, these contractual arrangements not only make statements made
during mediation inadmissible in court, but can also prevent the parties
from revealing these statements to the public or to other third-parties.114
However, there are several weaknesses to the use of confidentiality
agreements; thus, reliance on these agreements is undesirable in many
situations. Courts frequently “disregard clauses within confidentiality
agreements that purport to preclude a court from hearing evidence as being
contrary to public policy.”115
Additionally, even if a contract is
enforceable, the penalties for breaching the contract may not be a sufficient
deterrent to prevent someone from publicly revealing the apologetic
statement if the stakes are high enough.116 “Finally, contractual agreements
are not binding on third parties and therefore provide no protection from
claims and revelations made by those not party to the mediation.”117
II. BALANCING THE PROS AND CONS OF APOLOGIES AS EVIDENCE
Legal scholars and commentators have reached differing
conclusions as to the merits of granting evidentiary protection to

109. Id. at 575.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 576.
113. Id. at 573.
114. Id.
115. Advising Clients, supra note 19, at 1039; see also Bolstad, supra note 1, at 573.
116. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 573.
117. Id.
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apologies.118 While some commentators argue that the all-inclusive Federal
Rules of Evidence currently provide the best strategy for maintaining a
plaintiff’s ability to use probative evidence, others cite the judicial economy
and social benefits accompanying apologies and contend that jurisdictions
should amend their rules to exclude all apologies from evidence.119
Although both of these arguments certainly have their merits, this note
proposes that the best approach available is the middle ground.
The benefits of the middle ground approach are exemplified in the
balance that has been achieved in a growing number of state statutes that
provide protection for some, but not all, apologies. Specifically, this note
proposes that the most idyllic balance can be seen in those statutes that
exclude expressions of general benevolence, but do not prevent statements
that are clear admissions of fault from introduction into evidence.120 Before
further considering the merits of the partial apology balance, this note
considers several foundational questions. First, should the government
encourage individuals to apologize for wrongs they have caused by
providing evidentiary protection for such apologies? Second, if so, what
level of evidentiary protection is appropriate?
A. Should the Law Encourage Apologies?
The first foundational question warranting resolution is whether the
law should attempt to encourage individuals to apologize by providing any
degree of evidentiary protection. Several commentators have argued
against the adoption of evidentiary exclusions for apologies based on a
variety of reasons.121 Among these reasons, commentators argue that
“evidentiary exclusions rob apologies of their moral content and, in doing
so, undermine the sincerity and . . . healing efficacy of apologies.”122 In
other words, by offering incentives to apologize, apologies are de-valued
and less authentic. While these concerns are legitimate, the numerous
benefits that apologies provide for both the apologizer and the person
receiving the apology are so great that any devaluation to the apology is
offset by these gains. As discussed below, the admission of apologies as
evidence tends to discourage future apologies, therefore, adoption of
statutes designed to promote apologies is not only wise, but should be
encouraged.

118. Compare Jesson & Knapp, supra note 19, at 1438 (exhibiting skepticism that
evidentiary rules can influence human behavior and arguing that such rules undercut the
moral weight of apologies), with Advising Clients, supra note 19, at 1068 (discussing the
emotional and strategic benefits apologizing may bring to clients when done in a “safe” legal
means).
119. See Runnels, supra note 21, at 145.
120. See statutes supra note 15.
121. Jesson & Knapp, supra note 19, at 1438–39.
122. Id. at 1438 (citing White, supra note 2, at 1261).
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i. The Benefits of Apologies
In determining whether jurisdictions should attempt to encourage
individuals to apologize through evidentiary privileges and exclusions, it is
first important to understand the benefits provided by such apologies.123
While apologies do not affect every situation or individual equally, such
statements tend to provide positive psychological, emotional, and legal
outcomes for both the apologizer and person receiving the apology.124
First, apologies have the tendency to provide positive emotional
and psychological consequences for both the person apologizing and the
recipient of the apology by adding value to dispute resolution.125 Professor
Cohen, of Florida, Levin College of Law, an early advocate for the benefits
of apologies, notes:
After an injury, it is easy for parties to see the world in
zero-sum terms. Having been harmed, the injured party
may view the offender as an adversary, and expect that
what will be one side’s gain will be the other side’s loss.
The offender may fear such hostility from the injured party,
and may also adopt a zero-sum mind set. Further, postinjury negotiations, like all negotiations, inevitably involve
a distributive element. Often that distributive element is
quite large. For example, following a car accident, the
central question may be how much compensation the
defendant’s insurance company will pay to the injured
party.126
Professor Cohen continues by observing that, while an apology does not
always eliminate these distributive elements, it can add value to the
situation by creating benefits for both parties.127 For example, “[i]f the
parties knew one another before the injury, an apology may be an important
first step toward repairing their relationship.”128
Apologies may
additionally “help the injured party to feel less angry and the injurer to feel
less guilty” in certain situations.129
Professor Cohen also states that apology and forgiveness may offer
the benefit of promoting spiritual and psychological growth.130 “Within
many religious and ethical systems, offering an apology for one’s
wrongdoing is an important part of moral behavior, as is forgiving those
123. Apology, supra note 9, at 33.
124. Helmreich, supra note 8, at 574–75.
125. See id.
126. Advising Clients, supra note 19, at 1015.
127. Id. at 1015–16.
128. Id. at 1016.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1021.
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who have caused offense.”131 Within such systems, when an individual
apologizes for, rather than denies or avoids, the damage he has caused
someone else, that individual becomes a better person.132 Furthermore,
psychologically, when an offender fails to apologize, they may suffer by
harboring guilt, and when an injured party does not receive an apology,
they may suffer by storing anger.133
Second, apologies can provide benefits that are largely strategic,
rather than value-creating.134 Namely, apologies tend to prevent long legal
battles.135 According to several empirical studies, if apologies are given
early enough, they can help prevent lawsuits from being filed altogether.136
For example, in one British study, many plaintiffs who sued their doctors
said they would not have done so had they received an apology and an
explanation for their injury.137 While these results are certainly not
universal, they suggest that in many situations, compensation or other
substantive considerations may in fact be secondary to an apology and
resulting forgiveness.
Additionally, an apology, even if not full or perfect, can unlock a
stalled negotiation and facilitate settlement in situations where lawsuits
arise. In fact, the University of Michigan Health Service (UMHS) reported
that its per case payments decreased by 47% and the settlement time
dropped from twenty to six months after the introduction of the “Apology
and Disclosure Program,” which required that healthcare professionals
apologize to patients who complained of being injured while under the
UMHS care.138 Another highly publicized example is the apology from
basketball star Kobe Bryant during the course of rape accusations in
2004.139 Whether Mr. Bryant’s apology was a genuine, benevolent gesture
or the result of careful drafting and negotiation by attorneys, the result
remains the same: providing an apology helped Mr. Bryant avoid criminal
charges and lengthy, expensive civil litigation.140
ii. The “Chilling Effects” of Admissibility of Apologies
The next topic to consider in determining whether jurisdictions
should strive to promote apologies through evidentiary protection is the
effect that the absence of protection has on an individual’s tendency to
131. Advising Clients, supra note 19, at 1021.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1022.
135. Helmreich, supra note 8, at 574.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients
and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 THE LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994)).
138. Helmreich, supra note 8, at 575.
139. FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 24, at 157.
140. Id.
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apologize. The largest effect of admitting apologies into evidence is the
deterrent factor on the practice of apologizing.141 A prime example of this
phenomenon can be seen by examining the unfortunate situation which led
to the wave of apology legislation discussed above. The Massachusetts
apology statute, the first of its kind, was passed when former Massachusetts
state senator William L. Saltonstall convinced his successor, Robert C.
Buell, to draft the bill after Saltonstall’s daughter was killed in a car
accident and the offending driver never apologized or expressed regret.142
Senator Saltonstall discovered that the driver had wanted to apologize but
feared that “it would be used against him as tort evidence.”143 “It was this
chilling effect of evidence law that the former state senator and his
successor sought to reverse with the new legislation.”144
Such reluctance to apologize is often supported by advice that
individuals receive from legal consultations.145 “Many lawyers do not
realize that there are legally ‘safe’ ways to apologize.”146 Furthermore,
many lawyers may advise against apologizing because apologizing runs
counter to their “macho” strategy of lawyering, in which the lawyer prefers
to defeat their adversary in a courtroom battle rather than respond with
humility.147 Finally, lawyers may advise against apologizing due to loss
aversion.148 When faced with the option of (1) apologizing and taking a
small but certain loss and (2) not apologizing and gambling with the chance
of a very large loss or no loss at all, many attorneys will choose the
gamble.149
Considering the range of benefits that an apology can provide, in
addition to the negative effects that admitting apologies into evidence can
have on the practice of apologizing, states and the federal government
would be well served by creating legislation, or amending existing
legislation, to promote apologies.
B. What Level of Evidentiary Protection is Appropriate?
Therefore, if the law should encourage apologies through creating
rules that exclude apologies from admission into evidence, then the
question remains—what is the appropriate level of evidentiary protection
for such apologies? Specifically, should such protection be extended to
141. Helmreich, supra note 8, at 573. In fact, it has been noted that, “[p]erhaps, nothing
discourages the use of an apology in the United States today more than the fear of liability.”
Bolstad, supra note 1, at 565.
142. Helmreich, supra note 8, at 575.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 573.
146. Advising Clients, supra note 19, at 1042.
147. Id. at 1044.
148. Id.
149. Id.

2015]

STRIKING A BALANCE

261

full, fault-admitting, apologies, or should the partial apology approach of
the majority of states be taken?
i. Empirical Arguments for Full Apologies
A number of legal scholars have advocated protection for full,
fault-admitting, apologies.150
One such scholar, Professor Jennifer
Robbennolt, conducted an empirical study on the role of apology in
settlements that was published in 2003.151 In “her study[,] participants read
an accident scenario, were assigned the role of accident victim[,] and
evaluated a settlement offer from the other party.”152 Some offers included
“full” apologies with expressions of sympathy and admissions of fault,
while others included only “partial apologies” and expression of sympathy
with no acceptance of responsibility.153 Others included no apology at
all.154 Professor Robbennolt’s results indicate that when no apology was
offered, 52% of participants said that they would either definitely or
probably accept the offer, 43% said that they would reject it, and 5% were
uncertain.155 When a full apology was provided, 73% of participants said
that they would accept the offer, around 13% said they would reject the
offer, and 14% remained uncertain.156 When a partial apology was offered,
the results became much more varied. In this case, 40% of participants
remained undecided as to what course of action to take, while 35% of
participants were inclined to accept the offer.157 Although not as low as the
full apology results, the number of participants inclined to reject the offer
dropped, as compared to when no apology was offered, to 25%.158
Professor Robbennolt’s results demonstrate the value apologies
have in dispute resolution. Robbennolt counters the argument that
evidentiary protection for apologies will negatively affect apologies by
stating, “[t]here is . . . no evidence to suggest that protected apologies will
be less effective or less valued by claimants than unprotected apologies.”159
She continues, “[a]ccordingly, providing evidentiary protection for
apologies may serve to encourage the offering of apologies . . . without
150. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical
Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 505 [hereinafter Empirical Examination]; Runnels,
supra note 21, at 151.
151. Id. at 460.
152. Jesson & Knapp, supra note 19, at 1422 (citing Empirical Examination, supra note
150, at 484).
153. Id. (citing Empirical Examination, supra note 150, at 484–85).
154. Id. at 1423 (citing Empirical Examination, supra note 150, at 484).
155. Runnels, supra note 21, at 150 n.62 (citing Empirical Examination, supra note
150, at 485–86).
156. Id. (citing Empirical Examination, supra note 150, at 485–86).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Empirical Examination, supra note 150, at 504.
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diminishing the value and effectiveness of apologies so offered.”160
Professor Robbennolt argues, however, that current state statutes are
protecting the wrong types of apologies.161 She states that while the
majority of current statutes protect partial apologies and those portions of
full apologies that do not admit responsibility, it is the “full, responsibilityaccepting, apologies that have a positive impact on settlement decisionmaking[.]”162
ii. The Negative Aspects of Excluding Fault-Admitting Apologies
Although it is difficult to argue with the results of Professor
Robbennolt’s empirical analysis, and while full apologies most certainly
provide the greatest settlement opportunities and emotional benefits, these
added benefits must be considered in light of several negative aspects of
evidentiary protection for fault-admitting apologies. Specifically, plaintiffs
and the justice system as a whole will be disserved by prohibiting the
admission of statements into evidence that are often highly probative of
liability or fault. An article by Jeffrey Helmreich illustrates this point well.
He writes:
Consider, for example, a medical injury after which a
doctor says “I’m so sorry I delegated part of the surgery to
someone I now realize was not really up to the job.” Most
state apology laws would offer no protection to such a
statement, except perhaps not counting the “sorry” as a
further admission in its own right. One reason is that the
doctor’s remarks factually confirm behavior that could
contribute to negligence, and there is scarcely better
evidence of liability than expert admissions by the liable
party.163
As this passage exemplifies, jurisdictions should not exclude faultadmitting statements from admission into evidence. By allowing full
apology statutes to prohibit admissions of statements tantamount to a full
confession, simply because the speaker uttered the magic words, “I’m
sorry” before admitting liability, is dangerous policy and may significantly
weaken an individual’s ability to prove their case. The dangers of such an
approach are recognized by the jurisdictions that have adopted apology
protection.164 Over three quarters of the states that have created evidentiary
protection for apologies have expressly limited such protection to situations
160. Id.
161. Id. at 505.
162. Id.
163. Helmreich, supra note 8, at 578–79.
164. Id.

2015]

STRIKING A BALANCE

263

in which the apologizer does not admit fault.165 Further, the few states that
provide protection for fault-admitting apologies have minimized these
dangers by reducing the scope of protection to cover only the limited
context of medical malpractice litigation.166
iii. Striking a Balance
If adoption of rules that will exclude full apologies from admission
into evidence will provide a disservice to the justice system, how should
legislatures capture the previously mentioned benefits apologizing can
provide without running afoul of these detriments? The answer lies in in
the balance created by partial apologies.
First, partial apologies statutes alleviate the primary concern
implicit in full apology protection—that plaintiffs will be prevented from
introducing evidence probative of fault. This is because apologies that
express only sympathy or benevolence are not probative of fault, or are
only minimally so.167 For example, the Ohio Court of Appeals has noted,
“when hearing that someone’s relative has died, it is common etiquette to
say, ‘I’m sorry,’ but no one would take that as a confession of having
caused the death.”168 Thus, by ensuring that plaintiffs are able to use the
portions of apologies that express admission of fault, the law will not be
harmed by excluding other sympathy-expressing portions of apologies.
Second, while partial apologies undoubtedly do not provide the
level of emotional and psychological advantages that full apologies and
forgiveness provide, they still generate many helpful benefits. Although
some scholars have concerns that partial apology statements may be
perceived as disingenuous in comparison with full apology statements,169
and these concerns are legitimate, an expression of sympathy and
benevolence is far better than a prohibition from offering condolences for
fear that such a statement will be admitted in court. When no one offers an
apology, both parties are harmed. The injured party’s anger and resentment
builds, thus making him emotionally worse-off. Likewise, the would-be
apologizer suffers by losing the psychological relief forgiveness brings.
Protection of partial apologies is the effective middle ground between the
emotional and psychological healing full apologies provide and the harms
no apology protection inflicts.
Finally, partial apologies promote judicial economy by encouraging
settlement. While some commentators may argue a half-way approach
165. See statutes supra note 15.
166. Id.
167. Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 834.
168. Davis v. Wooster Orthopaedics & Sports Medicine, Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1216, 1220
(Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Schaaf v. Kaufman, 850 A.2d 655, 664 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2004)).
169. See Empirical Examination, supra note 150, at 505.
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does more harm than good—observing studies such as Professor
Robbennolt’s, in which the acceptance rate of an offer after a partial
apology was lower than an offer after no apology170—such an outlook takes
a pessimistic view of the empirical research. Looking to Professor
Robbennolt’s study as an example, the percentage of participants who
rejected the offer outright when given a partial apology (25%) was far
better than when given no apology at all (50%), and not considerably lower
than the rate for full apologies (13%).171 Stated differently, even if a partial
apology does not create an immediate settlement, it is effective at keeping
the parties at the table.
But even if the results of studies like Professor Robbennolt’s are
accepted, and full apologies are empirically more likely to result in
settlement than partial apologies, the balance achieved by partial apologies
cannot be ignored. Because partial apologies also alleviate the concern that
probative evidence will not be admitted and provide legal and emotional
benefits that are not available absent apologies, laws that encourage partial
apologies serve as an excellent compromise between full apology statutes
and jurisdictions that admit all apologetic statements.172
III. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
EXCLUDING “PARTIAL APOLOGIES”
Observing the successful balance between the legal, psychological,
and emotional benefits that apologizing has with the detriments that
protecting full apologies provides, this note proposes an amendment to the
Federal Rules of Evidence that grants evidentiary protection for partial
apologies. This note envisions incorporating such an amendment by
borrowing language from the state evidentiary rules discussed at length
above and joining these rules with current FRE 409. Rule 409 presently
bars the admission of evidence regarding offers to pay or payments of
medical, hospital, or similar expenses when offered as proof of the payer’s
(or offeror’s) liability for the injury.173 FRE 409 is a natural place to
incorporate a partial apology amendment because an offer to pay someone’s
medical expenses after an accident is quite frequently accompanied by an
apology. Though, the amendment will not change substantively if it is
added elsewhere.
However, for purposes of this note the proposed Rule 409 would
read, in its entirety, as follows:
(a) Offers to Pay Medical and Similar Expenses. Evidence
of furnishing, promising to pay, or offering to pay medical,
170. See id.
171. Id. at 485–86.
172. See Helmreich, supra note 8, at 578.
173. FED. R. EVID. 409 advisory committee’s notes.
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hospital, or similar expenses resulting from an injury is not
admissible to prove liability for the injury.
(b) Expressions of Sympathy or Benevolence. The portion
of statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to any
loss, pain, suffering, or death of a person involved in an
accident, and made, at any time, to that person or to the
family of that person, shall be inadmissible as evidence of
liability in a civil action.
(c) Exceptions. A statement of fault that is part of, or in
addition to, any of the above shall not be inadmissible
because of this Rule.174
There are several portions of proposed Rule 409 that warrant
further discussion and explanation. First, the amendment specifically
includes the words “at any time” to alleviate potential confusion as to the
scope of the rule. While FRE 408 necessarily limits exclusion to occasions
in which there is a compromise negotiation as to a disputed claim,175
proposed Rule 409(b) would apply regardless of whether the expression of
sympathy or benevolence occurs in mediation, at a settlement negotiation,
or on the side of the highway following a traffic accident.
Second, the proposed amendment applies only in civil cases in
which there has been an “accident,” and in which the benevolent statement
relates to the loss, pain, suffering, or death of a person involved in the
accident. Most of the state statutory provisions used to model this proposed
amendment specifically define the term “accident” as “an occurrence
resulting in injury or death to one or more persons which is not the result of
willful action by a party.”176 Proposed Rule 409(b) does not contain such a
definition because this definition would preclude expressions of
benevolence in which a person did not either physically or emotionally
suffer injury or die as a result of such injury. Specifically, the proposed
amendment allows for the possibility of apologetic statements that relate to
economic or proprietary harm to be excluded as well. This is further seen
by the proposed amendment’s inclusion of the intentionally vague coverage
of, “the portion of statements . . . relating to any loss.”

174. The language of section (a) was incorporated directly from the previous Rule 409,
while sections (b) and (c) were adapted from the following statutes and rule of evidence,
which are virtually identical: FLA. STAT. § 90.4026 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233,
§ 23D (2014); TENN. R. EVID. 409.1; WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010 (2014).
175. FED. R. EVID. 408.
176. See FLA. STAT. § 90.4026; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23D; TENN. R. EVID.
409.1; WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010.
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Third, proposed Rule 409(b) applies only to benevolent or
sympathetic statements made to the person injured by an accident, or the
family member of a person injured by an accident. This language envisions
an apologizer not only being able to express sympathy to the one that he has
directly harmed, but to those he has indirectly harmed – i.e. the family of
the injured party. Once again, several states’ statutory provisions provided
a list of individuals who would be included in the definition of family, but
because jurisdictions may differ on who should be included in this list, this
amendment is intentionally silent on this matter.177
Fourth, proposed Rule 409(b) only excludes evidence of a
benevolent statement, writing, or gesture if it is being offered to prove
liability. If such a statement was offered for some other reason, such as to
show the affect it had on the recipient, the Rule would not prevent its
admission.
Finally, as expected, proposed Rule 409(c) provides an exception
for a statement of fault that is made as a part of, or in addition to any
statement of benevolence or sympathy. In such a scenario, the statement of
fault remains admissible. However, the portions of the statement
expressing sympathy or benevolence would still be inadmissible, if such
portions are capable of separation. Additionally, the exception in section (c)
is listed separately from section (b) and, as such, intentionally affects
section (a), the portion containing the original Rule 409. This expressly
codifies a portion of original Rule 409’s advisory committee notes which
reads, “A statement of liability made in conjunction with such an offer is
not rendered inadmissible by Rule 409.”178 This is made possible due to the
compatible nature of the two provisions.
CONCLUSION
This note’s proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence
is not perfect. However, this amendment was crafted with the policies and
approaches of state apology statutes in mind. Consistent with Justice
Brandeis’ characterization, these states have served as a laboratory,
implementing “novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”179 In the laboratory of the states, the “partial apology
experiment” has proven to be a successful balance between allowing
evidence probative of fault and encouraging apologies. This success is
evident by the vast number of states who followed Massachusetts lead by
creating apology protection statutes of their own. In keeping with this trend
of protecting some, but not all, apologies from being admitted into
evidence, jurisdictions will likely continue to adopt similar protections.
This note proposes that the Federal courts become one of these jurisdictions
177. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026.
178. FED. R. EVID. 409 advisory committee’s notes.
179. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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by adopting an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence allowing for
partial apologies.
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